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CONCESSION BARGAINING
THOMAS MINER*

During the past two years, few events in the field of industrial relations have generated as much media coverage' and scholarly discussion 2 -as the subject of concession bargaining. Although the causes for
the upsurge in concession bargaining in the 1980's seem apparent, such
is not the case with respect to the present and future effects of concession bargaining on the process of wage and benefit determination.
DEFINITION OF TERMS

The term concession, as used by the media as well as by labor
analysts, has been defined to mean a variety of things. For example,
concession has been defined as reductions, cutbacks or givebacks in
wages and benefits.3 In other cases, it has been defined as wage and
benefit reductions plus the lessening of restrictive work rules resulting
from the early opening4 of existing contracts. 5 Finally, the acceptance
of a wage increase that is smaller than originally demanded has been
6
termed a concession.
The term concession, as used in this article, will connote reductions in employee wages and benefits. Included in this definition are
wage and benefit increases that historically would have been provided
in a new agreement but were not. For example, the first auto industry-United Auto Workers (UAW) agreement provided for an improvement factor wage increase in 1948. Historically, the improvement
factor wage increase had been included in all subsequent agreements.
* Vice President of Industrial Relations, Chrysler Corporation. This article is an expanded
version of Mr. Miner's Piper Lecture.
1. See, Concessionary Bargaining- Will the New Cooperation Last?, Bus. WK., June 14, 1982
at 66; Labor: No More Givebacks, NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1982 at 100; Freedman and Fulmer, Last
Rites for Pattern Bargaining, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1982 at 30; Labor Seeks Less, Bus.
WK., Dec. 21, 1981 at 82.
2. See, Mitchell, Recent Union Contract Concessions, BROOKING'S PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIVITY 165 (1982) [Hereinafter cited as Recent Concessions]; Remarks by Milton Derber before the
Chicago Chapter, Indus. Rel. Research Assoc. (Sept. 1982); Remarks by John T. Dunlop before
the Conference of Business Economists (Feb. 1982).
3. See, Labor Concessions: More Fable than Fact?, INDUS. WK., Feb. 8, 1982 at 19 [hereinafter cited as Fable].
4. Early opening refers to the entering into negotiations on a new labor agreement prior to
the date provided for in the existing labor agreement.
5. Recent Concessions, supra note 2, at 168.
6. Fable, supra note 3, at 20.
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Therefore, the UAW agreement in 1982 with Ford Motor Co. and General Motors Co. (GM) to forego an improvement factor wage increase
would constitute a concession as previously defined. Conversely, if the
UAW had agreed to give up an anticipated, expected or real wage increase in exchange for a job security plan whose cost during the term of
the agreement is the same as the wage increase that was foregone, then
such an agreement would not constitute a concession.
MANAGEMENT CONCESSIONS

Although much attention has been focused upon wage and benefit
concessions made by the unions, frequently such concessions were
trade offs in order for the union to make substantial inroads into areas
heretofore considered sacrosanct by management. Twenty years ago
who would have thought that a management would ever agree to place
members of its employees' union on its board of directors, not to close
plants or restrict its ability to outsource, 7 or open the books to the
union? Other inroads made by unions during concession bargaining
have included the establishment by management of employee stock
ownership and profit sharing plans, job and income security plans and
programs designed to give the union a greater voice at all levels of the
company.
REASONS FOR UPSURGE IN CONCESSION AGREEMENTS

Economists have cited a number of conditions that have led to
labor's recent willingness to enter into concession agreements-the prolonged recession, foreign competition, massive layoffs and the decline
in productivity. 8 To a large extent, these conditions reflect the past sins
of labor, management and the government. Most large companies in
the basic manufacturing industries were posting record profits during
the prolonged period of economic prosperity that stretched from the
early sixties to early seventies. During that time, these same companies
were chiefly concerned with short term profits at the expense of long
term financial stability. Higher costs could generally be passed on in
the form of higher prices. There was little incentive then to replace
outdated plants and equipment because of these higher earnings and
the fact that higher costs could generally be passed on to the consumer.
7. Outsource is when a company ceases production of a part or component and purchases
the same part or component from another company. Outsourcing generally occurs when a company determines it is less costly to purchase rather than produce a part or component.
8. Recent Concessions, supra note 3, at 188.
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Furthermore, foreign competition was not yet a factor. And we all
know we bought labor peace to keep the party going. In brief, America
had grown fat and lazy.
The good life came to a halt in 1979 when the Federal Reserve let
the prime rate float in a few months from 13% to 20% which precipitated a serious recession. Ballooning national debt and volatile interest
rates, which have fluctuated 73 times between 1979 and 1982, have
helped to prolong the recession by creating uncertainty among both
lenders and borrowers. The depth of the recession can be illustrated by
the following grim statistics: Between 1979 and 1982 industrial production declined 9%; plants which were operating at 86% of capacity are
now operating at only 67%, the lowest rate since the Federal Reserve
Board began keeping track in 1948; over 25,000 businesses went bankrupt in 1982, which is the most since 1932; and December's unemployment rate stood at 10.8%, the highest since 1940. 9 If we aren't in a
depression, then we are certainly in the most serious recession since the
1930's.
Besides skyrocketing interest rates and government borrowing,
foreign competition is also taking its toll on our basic manufacturing
industries such as steel, machine tools and autos, to name but a few.
Between 1960 and 1982, steel imports have increased from 3 million
tons per year to 17 million tons per year. During that same period,
domestic steel production has dropped from 99 million tons to 75 million tons. In 1960, the U.S. machine tool industry was ranked number
two in the world. Today, the U.S. ranks 5th behind Germany, Japan,
Italy and Switzerland. The auto industry is also suffering from foreign
imports. In 1960 only 8% of all cars sold in the U.S. were imports.
Although it is hard to believe, in that year Japanese car manufacturers
sold only 942 new cars in the U.S. Today, imports account for 28% of
the domestic car market. The Japanese account for more than 80% of
the total imports sold here, having sold over 1.7 million cars in the U.S.
last year.
The painful fact is U.S. industry is no longer a serious competitor
in an increasing number of world markets, or even at home. The rapid
expansion by foreign manufacturers in the U.S. as well as in other markets, has seriously eroded our industrial base. Unfortunately, this erosion shows every sign of continuing. For example, the Japanese have
9.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,

(Apr. 1983).

U.S.

DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

contracted with Boeing to build some of Boeing's new commercial jetliners, the 767, in Japan (with a healthy chunk of local content).
To reverse this trend, a tremendous infusion of capital into our
industries is required for productivity improvements that will make our
industries competitive in the world markets. We must modernize our
plants and equipment, introduce improved manufacturing processes
and techniques, and at least be willing to experiment with new styles of
management. If these measures are undertaken, they should go a long
way towards improving our deplorably low rate of productivity growth.
During the decade of the 1970's, we had the lowest growth rate in manufacturing productivity among the world's largest industrial powers
(the average annual rate was only 2.4% compared to 7.1% in Japan,
5.2% in Germany, 5.0% in France, 4.6% in Italy and 2.7% in Great Britain and Canada).' 0 In 1982, the U.S. manufacturing productivity rate
actually declined by 1.0% and the most optimistic long-term government forecast calls for only a 2.7% increase per year.
CONCESSION BARGAINING-TREND OR BLIP?

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that major settlements reached during 1982 provided for the smallest wage adjustment
since the BLS began compiling such data in 1967.11 The wage increases for all private nonfarm industries was 3.8% in 1982 compared to
9.5% in 1980 and 9.8% in 1981. An even more astounding statistic to a
nonstatistician like me is that 35% of the workers covered by settlements reached during 1982 will not receive a wage increase during the
entire term of their agreement. This is a dramatic increase compared to
the last two years-in 1980 less than 1% of workers covered by settlements and in 1981 only 1% of such workers did not receive a wage
increase.
Some maintain that the size of settlements has moderated because
management has taken the upper hand or because management is flexing its muscle, implying there has been a shift in power from labor to
management. 12 This is far from the case. Major industrial unions can
still force companies to their knees at any time. The strike weapon is as
10. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR STATISTICS, OUTPUT PER HOUR,
HOURLY COMPENSATION, AND UNIT LABOR COSTS IN MANUFACTURING, 11 COUNTRIES, 1960-

1980 (Dec. 1981).
I1.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CURRENT WAGE DEVELOPMENTS

(Apr. 1982); BUREAU OF LABOR

STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEPT. OF LABOR, CURRENT WAGE DEVELOP-

MENTS (Apr. 1981).
12. Moderation's Chance to Survive, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1982 at 123.
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potent as ever. What has happened is that the severe economic downturn has threatened the very survival of many basic manufacturing
companies. This, in turn, has caused managements to take a firm position with unions (which is what many managements should have done
years ago) and at the same time unions have acted in a much more
responsible manner recognizing that it is in their long-term interest as
well as in management's that the company survive.
A notable exception to this harmony or realism has been the steel
industry. The domestic steel industry has been buffeted by the recession, increased foreign competition and by world-wide excess capacity.
Many of the steel companies need concessions in order to survive and
yet attempts to reach concession agreements in July and November of
last year were voted down by the United Steel Workers. As of this
writing, a third attempt at reaching concession agreements is underway,
and it is hoped the union's instinct to survive will prevail this time.
Walter Reuther spoke of how the "economic pie" would be cut up.
Lately, the pie has shrunk and labor has been willing to take a smaller
piece. I would like to think that in the future labor will be satisfied
with a smaller piece of the pie. However, history has shown that once
the economy is on a firm upward course and the pie begins to grow,
labor will ask for a larger slice. In fact, even in some of the major
concession agreements negotiated in 1982, steps were taken to make
certain that if the industry's condition improved during the term of the
agreement, contracts could be reopened with the intent of restoring
what had been conceded. For example, the trucking agreement provides for reopening economic issues if the gross national product increases for three consecutive quarters. Similarly, the Ford, GM, and
AMC agreements can be reopened if U.S. retail deliveries of new cars
and trucks produced or exported by Ford, GM and AMC in any sixmonth period exceed a prescribed volume. In general, unions view
concessions as temporary measures. Once the problems plaguing a
company or industry are corrected, it is back to "business as usual" for
unions.
Although there has been a sizeable increase in the number of concession agreements negotiated since 1979, such agreements have been
concentrated within a realtively few industries which have been hard
hit by the recession, increased foreign competition and government deregulation. For example, in 1982, between 85% and 90% of the workers
who agreed to forego wage increases in their negotiated agreements
were in the auto, auto supply, trucking and meatpacking industries.
However, a number of companies in other industries have been able to
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negotiate more moderate wage and benefit increases for their unionized
employees. Once the economy moves into a full blown recovery and
industries such as auto and steel complete the necessary adjustments
required so that they can effectively compete in the world market, there
will likely be a tendency to return to the traditional pattern of bargaining and away from concession bargaining.
CONCESSION BARGAINING IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY

Turning to the condition of the auto industry, Chrysler's Chairman of the Board recently summed it up well when he said, "The current crisis we face is an industry-wide sales slump inside a national
3
depression inside a world recession."'
The downturn in the auto industry began in early 1979 and management didn't need a crystal ball to know that by the middle of 1979
the industry was in serious trouble. The Iranian revolution in March
and the almost overnight doubling in the price of gas caused a sudden
shift in consumer demand to smaller, more fuel efficient cars. This factor, coupled with the dramatic rise in interest rates and a widespread
feeling the country was about to enter into a serious recession, caused
domestic car sales to fall from 9.2 million units in 1978 to 8.2 million
units in 1979.
CHRYSLER CONCESSIONS,

1979-1981

Economies of scale play an important role in the profitability of
auto manufacturers. Therefore, the current downturn in sales especially hits hard the smaller manufacturers. This was particularly true
regarding Chrysler--the smallest of the Big Three. In 1979, Chrysler's
breakeven point was about 2.3 million units. Through the first six
months of 1979, Chrysler sales were running at an annual rate of only
1.7 million units which resulted in a $261 million loss.
It was against this backdrop that Chrysler entered into negotiations with the UAW in July of 1979. Chrysler immediately asked for a
two-year freeze on wages and benefits which was promptly rejected by
the UAW. However, the union openly recognized the seriousness of
Chrysler's financial condition and agreed to make some form of concessions. The outcome was that, on October 25, 1979, the UAW broke
from their pattern agreements with GM and Ford and reached a settlement with Chrysler which would save Chrysler $203 million over the
13. The American Way of Doing Business, Speech by L. A. lacocca, Chairman of the Board,
Chrysler Corporation, before the Commercial Club of Boston, Boston, Mass. (Dec. 7, 1982).
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term of the agreement. The principal concessions were delays in the
effective dates of the first, second and third year wage increases, the
elimination of six paid personal holidays and delays in pension
improvements.
The union had earlier agreed to permit Chrysler to defer $200 million in pension fund contributions in 1979 and 1980. At the same time,
the union gained some long-sought goals. UAW President Douglas
Fraser was made a member of Chrysler's board of directors. It is true
this was agreed to well before the 1979 agreement was reached and was
not discussed during the negotiations. Nonetheless, the two events will
always be tied together in the public's mind. Additionally, Chrysler
agreed to the following: 10% of its annual pension contribution would
be used to fund "socially desirable projects"; the union would have the
right to name five companies whose stock should not be invested in by
the pension fund because of these companies' failure to endorse the
"Sullivan Principles"; and finally, that the concessions made by the
union would be applied equally to all nonrepresented salaried
employees.
There were some people in Washington who felt that Chrysler
should have been able to negotiate a harder bargain than it did. However, in the summer of 1979, Chrysler put its case before the Carter
Administration on the need to obtain $750 million in federal aid if it
was to avoid bankruptcy. Washington spent most of the summer and
fall debating the pros and cons of rescuing Chrysler. Members of the
administration and certain congressmen made it clear that any aid
package agreed to must be tied to major concessions made by
Chrysler's bankers, suppliers and unions. Perhaps one reason the
union was unwilling to concede more than it did in its 1979 agreement
with Chrysler was due to its belief that regardless of the level of concessions made in 1979, it would be required to return to the bargaining
table once any Chrysler aid package was passed by Congress. If in fact
this was the union's reasoning, it was sound.
The second round of concession bargaining between Chrysler and
the UAW was triggered by the passage of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee
Act (Act) on December 21, 1979. The Act allowed Chrysler to borrow
up to $1.5 billion in federally guaranteed loans, provided certain conditions were met. One of the key provisions of the Act had to do with
"viability" which, roughly translated, meant that Chrysler had to be
able to demonstrate there was a reasonable chance the loans would be
repaid. The Act required that additional union concessions amounting
to $259 million ($243 million being the UAW's share) be negotiated
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before any loan guarantee could be issued. Therefore, in January,
1980, less than three months after the first concession agreement,
Chrysler was back at the bargaining table with the UAW. This time
around, Chrysler's Canadian UAW employees, who at the time were
under the same master agreement as Chrysler's U.S. employees, decided that the U.S. government was not going to dictate to them the
need for additional concessions, and therefore, they refused to adopt
the concessions agreed to by U.S. employees on January 5, 1980. (The
Canadian employees finally agreed to concessions on January 14,
1981). The new accord called for further delays in the effective dates of
the second and third-year wage increases provided under the 1979
agreement. Additionally, seventeen paid personal holidays were eliminated as well as the 1980 Sunday bonus holiday. During this time,
Chrysler also implemented a similar concession package applicable to
its nonunion salaried employees. These concessions totalled $125 million as was required under the Act. As a quid pro quo for the employee concessions, the Act required Chrysler to contribute $162.5
million, over a four-year period, to establish an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) for its employees.
Up to this point, all that the employee concessions resulted in were
temporary savings due to deferring implementation dates of wage and
benefit improvements. So by the termination of the 1979 agreement in
September of 1982, Chrysler's unionized employees would have caught
up with the industry pattern in all wage and benefit areas.
The auto industry continued its nosedive, and as a result, in December, 1980, Chrysler petitioned the Loan Guarantee Board for another drawdown under the Act. The Board established as a precondition for obtaining the requested drawdown that Chrysler extract
from the UAW additional concessions. Therefore, in January of 1981,
Chrysler was once again knocking on the union's door and by January
14th reached an agreement with the union which provided for an additional $622 million in wage and benefit concessions. Despite the prospect of bankruptcy, 44% of the employees voted against acceptance of
this agreement. Most of these employees were at plants whose level of
operation had been affected only slightly, if at all, by the auto depression. Few employees were on layoff from these plants and apparently
the feeling among these employees was that their jobs were not in jeopardy. If Chrysler went bankrupt, another company would purchase
their plant, and if Chrysler didn't go bankrupt, they would not be laid
off because the product produced at their plant was in demand. These
concessions resulted in permanent labor cost savings to Chrysler. For
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example, the then current cost of living adjustment (COLA) of $1.15
per hour was eliminated as well as future COLAs during the remaining
term of the agreement. Other items eliminated were the second and
third-year improvement factor wage increases, three personal days and
certain scheduled pension improvements. The estimated concessions
would result in Chrysler's labor costs being more than $4 per hour
lower than the competition by September 14, 1982, the termination
date of the 1979 agreement. As a trade-off for the union's concessions,
Chrysler agreed to establish an employee profit-sharing plan, to furnish
the union, each month, certain financial data presented to Chrysler's
board of directors, and to keep open certain plants Chrysler was contemplating closing.
FORD,

GM, AMC 1982 CONCESSION BARGAINING

Following the January, 1981 Chrysler-UAW concession agreement, General Motors and Ford began to exert increasing pressure on
the UAW to reopen negotiations on their existing contracts. In March
of 1981, the GM and Ford UAW councils met in Washington and resolved not to conduct early negotiations. Nonetheless, GM and Ford
continued to press for concessions to save jobs and reduce an $8 per
hour labor cost disadvantage they had with Japanese manufacturers.
Concurrently, Ford negotiated work rule concessions at four of its
plants and GM implemented a "Road to Survival" campaign to impress upon employees the need for concessions. In December of 198 1,
the UAW executive board rescinded its policy of refusing to renegotiate
existing agreements, leaving the question of early negotiations to the
respective councils. After canvassing the local union leadership, the
GM and Ford councils met in January of 1982 and agreed to reopen
negotiations with both companies. At the commencement of negotiations, GM announced that it had tentatively agreed that it would reduce car prices on a dollar-for-dollar basis with concessions received
from the UAW. However, these initial negotiations did not result in a
new agreement and talks broke off on January 20th with the parties
apart in three areas-economics, outsourcing, and job security. On
January 23rd, the GM council voted to resume discussions. However,
these negotiations also failed to result in a new agreement.
At this point negotiations shifted to Ford where a 3 1-month agreement was reached on February 13th. This agreement provided for the
following: the current COLA was frozen at December, 1981 levels
($2.03 per hour); the next three COLAs were each deferred for eighteen
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months; the paid personal holiday plan was eliminated as was the Sunday bonus holiday; and the improvement factor increases which had
been 3% per year in prior agreements were eliminated. Ford, in exchange for these labor concessions, established an employee profitsharing plan, improved income protection for employees impacted by
layoffs and plant closings, put a moratorium on plant closings and put
restrictions on outsourcing. The new Ford agreement was ratified by
73% of the union membership.
In early March, the UAW-GM committee voted to resume negotiations and an agreement similar to Ford's was reached on March 21,
1982. This agreement was ratified by 52% of the voting membership.
In November of 1981, American Motors Corporation (AMC), in
order to achieve its $1 billion future product plan, sought assistance
from the UAW. AMC proposed to the UAW a plan whereby employees would defer certain wages and benefits which AMC would later pay
back. The UAW agreed in December to study this proposal and negotiations opened in March of 1982. A three and one-half year agreement was reached in April which provided that workers defer the
following: six quarterly COLAs between March, 1982 and June, 1983;
improvement factor wage increases in 1982, 1983 and 1984; and a
number of paid days off between 1982 and 1984. It was agreed that
these deferrals would be repaid to the employees, with 10% interest,
between 1985 and 1988 in accordance with formulas based on AMC
production and/or profit. The new agreement required ratification by
all three AMC locals. After initially being rejected only by Toledo
Jeep, the agreement was resubmitted and approved at Toledo.
1982

CHRYSLER NEGOTIATIONS

Union Objectives and Strategy
It was against a backdrop of three concession agreements in three
consecutive years and no wage increases in nineteen months, that the
Chrysler council of the UAW met in Memphis in May of 1982 to formulate its demands. Historically, the UAW at its collective bargaining
conventions has tended to demand a great deal more than it knows it
can obtain from the management, and this time proved to be no exception. It demanded restoration of wage and benefit concessions made
between 1979 and 1981, full parity in wages and benefits with Ford and
GM workers and substantial improvements in job and income security
to name but a few items. The union's demands would have increased
Chrysler's costs by about $750 million per year.
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Douglas Fraser, UAW President, repeatedly said that in the 1982
negotiations, Chrysler had to start on the long, long road back to parity. It was clear from the beginning that the union would not accept
any additional concessions. Included in the union's definition of concession was any tampering with the employee health care and pension
plans despite the fact that Chrysler said it would return any savings
generated by a reduction in these plans in the form of increased wages.
Chrysler Objectives and Strategy
In contrast to the union demands to restore the concessions made
in the last three years, Chrysler was faced with the need to hold labor
costs constant due to the depressed car market and the high cost of
fixed fringe benefits such as health care and pensions. At the same
time, it was obvious to management that a new agreement would have
to provide an increase in take-home pay. To provide this increase and
at the same time keep total labor cost increases to a minimum, Chrysler
proposed the elimination of inefficient work practices and the restructuring of fringe benefits to generate savings that could be passed along
to employees in the form of increased take-home pay.
Consistent with its strategy of restructuring the wage and benefit
package, Chrysler presented the union with a very extensive list of proposals for changes in the working agreement and benefit plans. The
number of proposals presented by Chrysler caught the union off guard
as it had difficulty in coming to grips with Chrysler's offensive strategy.
Throughout the negotiations, Chrysler hammered away at the union
that it was essential to get health care and pension costs in line by restructuring the health care plan and changing the early retirement provisions of the pension plan. Detailed presentations were made to the
union explaining Chrysler's position on these issues. Chrysler stressed
to the union that to compete in today's market it was absolutely necessary to eliminate or change various work practices that have an adverse
impact on productivity. As a result, more hours were spent discussing
Chrysler proposals than those of the union.
Terms of the September, 1982 Settlement
During the final days of negotiations, it became clear that the
union was not willing to accept what Chrysler offered in a two-year
agreement, and Chrysler was in no position to accept the cost increases
that the union was demanding. The only way to resolve this impasse
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was for both sides to agree to a two-year agreement that provided for a
one-year economic reopener.
The agreement reached on September 16, 1982, reinstated the
COLA formula then in effect for Ford and GM workers with one important difference. Chrysler did not agree to restore any of the COLA
which had been generated during the term of the 1979 agreement. The
agreement did include a wage bonus plan which provided quarterly
lump sum wage payments to workers contingent upon Chrysler's profits reaching a certain level. The parties also agreed to the following:
elimination of the Sunday bonus holiday for 1982 and 1983; health care
cost reduction programs; and the establishment of a committee called
the Roundtable, composed of top officers of Chrysler and the UAW
that would provide a nonadversarial approach to problem-solving.
The purpose of the Roundtable would be to improve communications
among the union, management and employees, and to improve operational competitiveness and quality.
The union characterized the agreement as "meager," "modest"
and "skimpy" but nonetheless presented it to the rank and file as an
agreement for survival. As it turned out, the agreement was not ratified
by the rank and file. The reasons given for this rejection were coextensive. The rank and file wanted an immediate pay increase and believed
that Chrysler, in light of its highly publicized $1 billion cash reserve,
could afford to give a wage increase.
Second Round of Negotiations
Once it became clear the settlement would be rejected, the question that confronted both the union and management was "where to
now?" because this was the first time in history that an automotive settlement had been voted down. Chrysler could ill afford a protracted
strike given its sensitive financial condition.
The union, well aware of the devastating effects of a strike acted in
a very responsible manner to try to diffuse the strike sentiment that
existed among the rank and fie. It gave the membership the option of
striking Chrysler on November 1st or to recess the negotiations until
January of 1983 in the hope that economic conditions would have improved by then, and therefore, Chrysler would be in a better position to
grant a wage increase. The union believed that the rank and fie would
recognize that there would be nothing to gain by going on strike in
November and experiencing payless paydays during a period of heavy
winter and Christmas expenses and at the same time lose eight paid
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holidays. The outcome was that employees voted overwhelmingly to
extend the existing agreement until January, 1983.
Chrysler-UAW CanadianNegotiations
In the meantime, Chrysler and union negotiators in Canada were
bargaining against a November 5th strike deadline. The union was
holding steadfast to its demand for parity in wages with Ford and GM
workers, which meant about a $3 per hour wage increase. In every
negotiation since 1958, except one, the union went out on strike. And
on November 5th, the workers extended their record by walking out.
The Canadian UAW strategy was simple. Since Chrysler's U.S.
operations were dependent upon certain parts produced at its Canadian
plants, the Canadian UAW knew it was only a matter of time before
they would be able to shut down all of Chrysler's operations. This put
the UAW in a superior bargaining position. On the other hand,
Chrysler's strategy was to leave the Canadian employees on strike until
such time as they exhibited a willingness to discuss a substantially
smaller wage increase. To protect its domestic operations, Chrysler
made arrangements to find U.S. producers of those parts produced in
its Canadian plants in order to avoid a shutdown. Nonetheless, about
four weeks after the strike had begun, it became evident that it was
causing a substantial erosion in Chrysler's earnings. Chrysler, therefore, would have to make a concerted effort at ending the strike.
As talks resumed on both sides of the border, the union in the U.S.
changed an earlier position that it had taken regarding wages, and this
change provided one of the keys to settling the Canadian strike.
Throughout the negotiations, the union had maintained that Chrysler's
Canadian employees could not get "one cent more" than their U.S.
counterparts. Late in November, UAW President Douglas Fraser said
he would support the "Canadian effort to get equity for Canadian
workers, based on economicfacts in Canada." This meant the settlement in Canada could be larger than in the U.S. provided that it was
based on economic differences between the two countries.
Chrysler still faced the dual problem of meeting union demands
for higher wages and keeping labor costs in line. Chrysler's solution
was to lengthen the term of the rejected agreement from one year to
two, thus allowing it to spread any up-front wage increase over a longer
time period. The parties agreed to try to reach a two-year agreement.
However, the UAW in Canada continued to insist on a substantial first
year wage increase ($1.15 per hour) as well as an unspecified "substan-

994
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tial" second-year wage increase. To move matters along, Chrysler, on
December 3rd, advised the union that striking Canadian employees
must be back on the job by December 13th or negotiations would be
postponed until January. Postponement would result in the Canadian
workers losing all their paid Christmas holidays. This provided the
impetus for the two sides to reach an agreement.
Terms of the CanadianAgreement-December, 1982
The Canadian agreement included a wage increase of $1.15 per
hour, which reflected Canada's relatively higher cost of living. This
increase was partially offset by various labor cost reductions. The
agreement provided for the following:
1. Elimination of the employee profit-sharing plan, thus saving
Chrysler an estimated thirty cents per hour;
2. Canadian UAW employees foregoing their third and fourth year
payments under the ESOP which was the equivalent of a twentynine cents per hour savings;
3. Rejection of the quarterly wage bonus plan-saving sixteen cents
per hour;
4. A twenty-five cent per hour increase was granted to track the
increase given in the Ford and GM Canadian settlements (this
reflected Canada's higher inflation rate); and
5. A fifteen cent per hour cost of living adjustment was granted.
Within a matter of hours after the Canadian settlement was
reached, Chrysler and the U.S. UAW agreed to a first-year wage increase of seventy-five cents per hour which was fourteen cents per hour
more than the rejected agreement.
CONCESSION BARGAINING--EFFECT ON PATTERN BARGAINING

What effect, if any, concession bargaining will have on the power
of major industrial unions to negotiate pattern settlements in various
industries is not clear. However, from settlements in various industries
it appears that the unions' power has only been transitorily affected by
concession bargaining. For example, in the rubber industry, the pattern agreement that was set by B. F. Goodrich in 1982 was adopted by
most other major tire manufacturers. Pattern settlements also seem
firmly entrenched in the steel industry. Lloyd McBride, president of
the United Steel Workers (USW) has made it clear that the USW
would continue industry-wide bargaining with the "Big Eight" steel
companies when he said, "It would not be in the long range interest of

KENNETH M PIPER LECTURE

' 4
anyone to fracture our [USW] coordinated bargaining." 1
In the auto industry, the concessions granted Chrysler, Ford and
GM were in response to specific and transitory problems faced by these
companies.
Chrysler's situation was a classic case of survival bargaining.
Chrysler would either obtain the concessions sought by it in 1979-81 or
face certain bankruptcy. This was not the case with Ford and GM.
The UAW agreed to wage and benefit concessions in order to curtail
massive layoffs that were then occurring at Ford and GM.
However, in Chrysler's 1982 negotiations, the UAW said the 1982
settlement must represent the first step on the long road back to parity
with Ford and GM workers. As it turned out, it was a fairly large first
step because it reduced Chrysler's wage rate differential with Ford and
GM from about $3 per hour to about $2.40 per hour in one year. And
the UAW was able to achieve this rather healthy settlement at a time
when Chrysler's financial underpinnings were still pretty wobbly.
Given this situation, it appears likely that once Chrysler returns to
profitability on a consistent basis and liquidates all or part of its $1.2
billion federally guaranteed debt, the UAW will expect to receive parity
wages from Chrysler. The union leadership sold the idea of concessions to the rank and file as a temporary measure to tide Chrysler over
until it was back on its feet. If parity is achieved, it will be difficult, if
not impossible, in subsequent negotiations for Chrysler to vary from
the auto industry pattern as long as Chrysler remains financially sound
and profitable. If the forecasted level of domestic auto sales for 1983
and beyond are realized, the auto industry may never again return to
concession bargaining.
PATTERN FOR SURVIVAL

Perhaps the most important question now facing labor and management is what changes must occur in the collective bargaining process in order to restore America's basic manufacturing industries to
their pre-eminent position in the world economy. The events experienced by Chrysler during the past three years shed some light on the
answer to this question.
The UAW and Chrysler recognized that if the company was to
avoid bankruptcy, not only must operating costs be reduced, but the
union and Chrysler had to become more flexible on issues and posi14. Steel Bargaining: The Last Chance, Bus. WK., Jun. 17, 1983 at 94.
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tions affecting the well-being of the company and its employees. In
addition, there had to be a much greater degree of trust and openness
in dealings between the union and Chrysler. Moreover, individual and
group interests had to be subordinated to common interests and goals
and there had to be a recognition that these common goals could not be
attained unless conflict was replaced by cooperation.
The adversity which has plagued Chrysler has brought about a
closer working relationship between it and the UAW, and this has resulted in a better understanding on the part of both parties as to each
other's problems. The result has been that the historical "We-Them"
is gradually being replaced by a joint approach to problem solving.
The parties are not home yet by a wide margin, but they are on the
right course. The hope for the future of American industry ties to a
large extent on how successful labor and management are in changing
the collective bargaining process from one based on conflict to one
based on cooperation.

